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Abstract
This paper combines the concept of market sidedness with excess option demand (changes in
open interest) to solve the empirical challenge of separating directional from uninformed trading
motives in widely available, unsigned options data. Our measure of options market sidedness
persistently predicts the sign and strength of stock returns. Trading strategies conditional on
the measure are highly profitable. For instance, when the measure indicates positive (negative)
information, out-of-the-money calls (puts) generate returns of 27% (32%) over roughly four
weeks. Risk-adjusted returns of a long-short equity strategy yield more than 2%. An increase
in directionally informed demand predicts a decrease in option liquidity and increases in pricing
inefficiency.
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1 Introduction
A body of work in finance has documented the effects of asymmetric information on the
functioning of financial markets (e.g., Kyle 1982, Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Easley and
O’Hara 1987). To financial economists and practitioners it is important to accurately deter-
mine to what extent there is informed demand in a market at a given point in time. Among
other things options provide investors with leverage and therefore we expect informed trading
in option markets (see Black 1975, Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas 1998). However, identifying
informed demand is challenging since it has to be separated from other trading motives such as
hedging and liquidity. To further complicate issues any return predictability associated with
a measure of informed trading needs to be separated from other sources of return predictabil-
ity that are not due to directional information, such as risk premia, volatility information or
mispricing.
To deal with these challenges in a direct and easy to implement way, this paper combines
the concept of market sidedness developed by Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) with excess option
demand (changes in open interest) to construct a measure of options market sidedness that
captures the sign and the magnitude of directional information in widely available unsigned
option data.1
The motivation for the measure is as follows: Directionally informed investors have an
incentive to trade in those contracts that provide them with high leverage. This implies
that the increase in the open interest of high leverage options (out-of-the money options)
should be larger than the change in the open interest of low leverage options (in-the-money
1 The open interest of a call or put option refers to the total number of outstanding options of a specific
contract type. Since the number of outstanding option contracts is endogenous, an increase in the open
interest indicates, endogenously, an excess demand for options. The existing literature has primarily used
volume, option prices, bid-ask spreads or implied moments to study informed trading in option markets.
However, there are many motives for trade and therefore changes in open interest have advantages over
trading volume as a measure of informed demand. For example, liquidity needs and hedging demand results
in volume, but may well leave the open interest unchanged (see Section 2 for a more detailed description).
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options).2 Additionally, when informed investors have positive information we expect a higher
demand for call options than for put options and vice versa in the negative information case.3
Therefore in order to capture situations characterized by a high degree of positive information
we relate changes in the open interest of out-of-the-money (OTM) call options (the most
attractive options for investors with positive information) to the change in open interest of
in-the-money (ITM) put option contracts. Specifically our positive information measure is
the 30-day rolling correlation between the change in the open interest of OTM call options
and the change in open interest of ITM put options.4 We construct an analogous options
market sidedness (OMS) measure for detecting when investors have negative information.
Intuitively, a low value of our measure implies that increases in demand for contracts that
are particularly sensitive to information trading are not associated with increases in demand
for contracts that are relatively insensitive to information trading. In the terminology of
Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) the market is one-sided and is characterized by asymmetric infor-
mation. On the other hand a high value of our measure indicates that demand for information
trading sensitive contracts is also associated with increases in demand for contracts that are
information insensitive, the market is two-sided and option demand is more likely driven by
heterogeneous beliefs.
To examine whether options market sidedness captures informed trading, we use a dataset
of all exchange traded securities at the intersection of OptionMetrics Ivy DB, the CRSP daily
return files from January 1996 until December 2009 with more than 5 million observations.
We find that options market sidedness predicts the sign and the magnitude of future returns
of the underlying even after controlling for a wide range of factors, including alternative
2 There is usually a certain “natural” level of option contract creation and closing, for instance due to
synthetic option creation for technical trading strategies that involve as a replication or closing instrument
ITM options and the short side of OTM options (see e.g., Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson and Poteshman 2007).
3 Despite the high probability that informed traders create new long positions we can naturally not exclude
that informed traders also use different strategies. Incorporating these trades would make our results only
stronger but would come at the cost of a much more complicated methodology to measure options market
sidedness that is hard to use in practice.
4 More formally we compute the positive information measure as OMS+ = corr(∆OICOTM ,∆OI
P
ITM ), where
∆OICOTM denote the changes in open interest of OTM call options and ∆OI
P
ITM the changes in open
interest of ITM put options, respectively.
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measures of informed trading. A one standard deviation decrease in the OMS+ (OMS−)
measure predicts an increase (decrease) of future returns of more than 6 basis points on a
daily basis and more than 16% annually.
Trading strategies based on options market one-sidedness are highly profitable. Using
options market sidedness to select option contracts yields average returns of 27% for OTM
calls and 32% for OTM puts over roughly four weeks. To make sure that our results are
robust to option bid-ask spreads and the implicit leverage of options we construct long-short
equity portfolios based on options market one-sidedness. Our strategies generate monthly
risk-adjusted returns of up to 2.22%.
Further, we study options market sidedness prior and post to M&A announcements to
examine whether our measure indicates the presence of significant asymmetric information
that is resolved on the announcement date. Consistent with this, we find that our measure
decreases prior to the announcement and increases post announcement.
In a robustness exercise, we verify that options market one-sidedness is not related to
contemporaneous and future stock liquidity and trading volume. This alleviates concerns
that our results are driven by changes in liquidity of the underlying or increases in hedging
demand driven by greater stock market volume.
Given that options market sidedness identifies informed trading it is likely that market
makers respond to the presence of informed investors. We find that options market one-
sidedness is associated with future higher option bid-ask spreads. Additionally, we find that
a more one-sided options market predicts violations of put-call parity. These results are
consistent with market makers gradually incorporating the information in the demand of
informed traders and more generally with the perspective furthered by Garleanu, Pedersen
and Poteshman (2009) that demand pressure in options markets should impact prices and
price efficiency.
A possible alternative explanation of our results is that investors are not informed about
the returns of the underlying, but about the volatility (see e.g., Back 1993, Ni, Pan and
4
Poteshman 2008, Puhan 2014). Hence, it is important to distinguish whether the excess
demand is coming from directional or volatility traders. To this end we develop a measure of
volatility informed trading and find that including our measure of volatility informed demand
does not qualitatively affect our previous results.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this paper introduces the concept of mar-
ket sidedness to the options market literature and examines its predictability and information
content. Second, the measure of options market sidedness that we develop has a number of
desirable features: i) OMS captures the part of option demand that is in excess of the de-
mand associated with other trading motives. This solves the empirical challenge of separating
informed demand from other motives of trade in the options markets; ii) the information con-
tent is volatility neutral, which is to say that the predictability associated with the measure
is not due to volatility information;5 iii) the measure is easy to calculate and uses only widely
available and low frequency data, which means it is applicable to a large set of markets beyond
the US, for long time periods and it does not require any investments in new databases.6 It
also does not require a structural model that signs trades as buyer or seller initiated. Third,
by using our measure of market sidedness we document the presence of informed demand
in option markets that is not driven by other trading motives or other potential sources of
return predictability. In particular, our work complements Pan and Poteshman (2006) who
document that put-to-call volume ratios only when computed from signed options volume
from detailed quote records (for most markets not widely available) contain directional in-
formation data; moreover, OMS can also clearly identify the sign and the strength of the
directional information and indicates when markets are driven by uninformed trading mo-
tives (high measure values). In contemporary work Johnson and So (2012) find only negative
5 For example, implied volatilities or asymmetries in implied moments have been shown to predict returns
(see e.g., Cremers and Weinbaum 2010, Xing, Zhang and Zhao 2010). However, these measures are not by
construction or intention volatility neutral.
6 While detailed option quote data is available for the US since a few years, it is not for most other markets
around the world. Moreover, most investors are unlikely to buy the very expensive highly specialized
US data and use only data that is widely available in databases that also provide a diversified set of
different time series and hence cover the wide range of data that investors need such as Thomson Reuters,
Bloomberg or FactSet.
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information in options trading using the option to stock volume ratio (O/S) by Roll, Schwartz
and Subrahmanyam (2010) while we show that there is also substantial positive information
in options trading. Moreover, they cannot differentiate between markets that are driven by
uninformed motives of trade and options markets that exhibit asymmetric information. Using
signed option volume, Ge, Lin and Pearson (2015) highlight that the O/S ratio, conditioned
on the trade direction, predicts also positive returns. However, they use data of an exchange
that is relatively small and not commonly used by institutional investors (who are most likely
to be better informed and who prefer to trade in the most liquid markets) and not available
for other markets. Moreover, they find no predictability for the institutional investors part
of their data but they do before corporate events that are ex-ante publicly known and asso-
ciated with high stock market sidedness, volatility and more option trading activities. These
findings indicate that their data captures only general demand shifts in the market but does
not single out the demand of informed traders. Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005) also provide
evidence in support of informed trading but they focus exclusively on takeover events.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our concept of
options market sidedness. Section 3 details the data and investigates the sidedness of the
options market around M&A announcements. Section 4 tests the relation of options market
sidedness and future stock returns. Section 5 considers trading strategies that condition on
options market sidedness. In Section 6, we study the links between informed option demand
and stock market trading. Section 7 considers the impact of informed option demand on
liquidity levels and pricing efficiency. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Measuring Options Market Sidedness
Our measures of option market sidedness uses the fact that informed traders are most likely
to build up long positions in high leverage options that consequently are the most information
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sensitive.7 Therefore, associated with an increase in informed trading, the demand (which
is proxied for by changes in open interest) for those contracts should increase relative to
contracts that are less information sensitive.
We define an OMS measure for positive (OMS+) and negative (OMS−) information trad-
ing, respectively. We compute the positive information measure OMS+ as the correlation of
the change in open interest of OTM call options and the change in open interest of ITM put
options. More formally, the value of the positive signal measure OMS+t is computed on each
day t as
OMS+t =
1
τ
t∑
s=t−τ
(
∆OICs,OTM −∆OI
C
t−τ :t,OTM
)(
∆OIPs,ITM −∆OI
P
t−τ :t,ITM
)
√
σ2
∆OICt−τ :t,OTM
√
σ2
∆OIPt−τ :t,ITM
, (1)
for a backward looking window of τ days.8
Analogously, in case of negative information trading, the OMS− measure is the correlation
of the change in open interest of OTM put options with the change in the open interest of
ITM call options.
Intuitively, when either correlation is low then increases in demand for information sensitive
(out-of-the-money) contracts are not accompanied by increases in demand in less sensitive
(in-the-money) contracts. In the terminology of Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) the market
7 An alternative would be, for instance, to go short in the opposite contract type. However, this would expose
the informed trader to much higher risk and margin requirements, which makes this trading alternative less
attractive. In support of this argument, previous work, such as Garleanu et al. (2009), Pan and Poteshman
(2006), Lakonishok et al. (2007), Muravyev (2013), Easley et al. (1998), Choy and Wei (2012) or Chesney
et al. (2011), highlights the creation of new long positions in out-of-the-money options as main channel
of information related option trading. This is supported by occasional evidence such as in Poteshman
(2006) who identifies how informed investors used long out-of-the-money put options of airline companies
prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Another example is the case of the German Commerzbank where in
April 2011 in the week before a recapitalization announcement some investors took large positions in new
out-of-the-money puts and realized large profits due to the post announcement stock price decline.
8 In our analysis, we compute the time series of the daily OMS measures for each security, for a τ =
30-day backward looking correlation between daily changes in open interest. The choice of this time
window follows the idea that it would be rather counterintuitive to assume that most often options market
informed trading happens at longer-term horizons (cf., Easley et al. 1998). We have also tested a decreased
or expanded correlation window size within a reasonable range of days (15 to 45 days), but our results
remain qualitatively unchanged.
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is one-sided and is characterized by asymmetric information.9 On the other hand when
the correlation is high then an increase in demand of information sensitive contracts is also
associated with an increase in less information sensitive contracts.10
Our measure is also able to capture when informed investors have a particularly strong
signal. In such cases there will be a particularly large demand for OTM options and in
equation (1) the deviation from the mean level of demand will be large and all other things
being equal the correlation will take lower values.
There are three advantages of using a correlation over alternative measures such as a simple
ratio, a difference in mean values or simple changes in open interest. First, the correlation is
standardized by the variation of the variables (so in a simple sense we control for volatility).
Second, the variation is benchmarked against its own mean, implying that we are considering
above average deviations in open interest. Third, a correlation considers whether the stan-
dardizes above average excess demand in OTM options in the estimation window coincides
with above average excess demand of ITM options. While ratios and differences in means can
also be formed using standardized variables and with averages across certain time windows,
the ability to capture the comovement of two variables over time is unique to a correlation
measure.
We base our measure on changes in open interest since this arguably has a stronger connec-
tion with informed option demand. Table 1 illustrates the effect on volume and open interest
of a transaction between Buyer A and Seller B.
In case 1 buyer A wants to buy a contract to open a new position and seller B has to
create a new position in order to cater to the demand, the open interest increases and there
is positive trading volume. Alternatively, in case 2, if buyer A enters the options market to
buy a contract to close a position, and seller B sells this contract, thereby closing a previously
held position, there is a decrease of open interest along with positive option trading volume.
9 Due to technical trading strategies, liquidity needs or hedging demand, there is always a certain natural
level of demand and supply across contract types.
10 An alternative measure would relate the open interest OTM calls to OTM puts, but this measure would
not be able to distinguish the sign of the information.
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Table 1: ∆OI vs. V olume. The table summarizes all possible four combinations for the opening
and closing of option positions between some buyer A and some seller B. The column named ∆OI
indicates the potential changes in the open interest related to the trading combination and their
sign. The column V olume reports whether there is a positive trading volume.
Buyer A Seller B ∆OI V olume
1: buy to open sell to open > 0 > 0
2: buy to close sell to close < 0 > 0
3: buy to open sell to close = 0 > 0
4: buy to close sell to open = 0 > 0
While both case 1 and case 2 result in a change in the open interest it is likely that case
1 is going to contain the most information. Intuitively, the demand from informed investors
is going to result in the creation of new contracts and this is supported by the findings of Ni
et al. (2008), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Muravyev (2013), Lakonishok et al. (2007), Bollen
and Whaley (2004), Easley et al. (1998), Garleanu et al. (2009) or Chesney et al. (2011). Put
differently, for case 2 to contain information this requires that the informed investor and the
market maker to have open positions in this option, which is on average relatively unlikely
given that the signal is truly informative.
Furthermore, in cases 3 and 4, we observe positive trading volume, however, since in both
cases one party opens and another party closes a position, there is no change in the open
interest even though we observe trading volume. This illustrates why using trading volume is
different from considering excess option demand and arguably why it is a more noisy measure
of informed demand.11
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
In this section we describe the data selection, summarize the data and provide evidence about
options market sidedness around M&A announcement dates.
11 The difference between changes in open interest and volume is also evident in the unconditional correlation
of OTM option changes in open interest and trading volume, which is only 0.1 for call options and 0.08
for put options, respectively. Consistent with this, the unconditional correlation of the OMS measure
computed with changes in open interest and an OMS measure computed with trading volume is very low
and only 0.118 and 0.124 for OMS+ and OMS−, respectively.
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3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Our daily options market data consist of all American option contracts for all available US
stocks at the intersection of OptionMetrics Ivy DB and CRSP stock market data described
below.12 The options have a standard settlement (i.e., per contract 100 shares of the under-
lying are delivered at exercise). The sample period is January 1996 until December 2009. We
exclude option contracts with a maturity of more than 250 days and observations with no or
zero open interest to exclude options without liquidity (cf., Driessen et al. 2009). We merge
this data with the daily stock market data from the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ return
files. Only securities from the merged CRSP and Compustat database are in the sample.
As common practice in the literature we exclude stocks with a return history of less than 24
consecutive months to ensure the reliability of our regression results. We exclude observations
at the 99% and 1% level with respect to BM and we exclude stocks with a stock price below
1USD or with a return above 80% or below -80%.13 After applying these filter rules, 4,155
firms remain in our final sample and 35,349 call and put contracts resulting in more than 5
million daily observations for each variable.
We then sort all option contracts of each stock in moneyness categories in order to aggregate
the option variables of interest for each moneyness group. Similar to e.g. Chakravarty et al.
(2004), Lakonishok et al. (2007) or Xing et al. (2010) we define the moneyness range for
options as the ratio of the strike price K and the stock price S (for call options K
S
and for put
options S
K
).14 For OTM options the respective ratio is larger than 1.05 and for ITM options
it is smaller than 0.95. Accordingly, ATM options have a moneyness range of 0.95–1.05. For
the OTM part of our OMS measure we consider those contracts that are OTM on at least 2
12 OptionMetrics Ivy DB is a comprehensive data set with information on the entire US equity options
market.
13 The annual book-to-market ratio on day t is given by the previous year’s end-of-year book equity divided
by the corresponding year’s market equity (BM) (see Daniel and Titman 2006).
14 To test the robustness of our results with respect to our moneyness definition we also compute the mon-
eyness ratio as ln
(
K
F /IVATM
√
T
)
, where F is the futures price and IVATM is the implied volatility of
ATM options of the respective stock. Our results qualitatively do not change if we use this ratio.
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out of 5 days during the fourth week before the maturity date. 15
After selecting options into moneyness categories we aggregate the daily open interest for
each moneyness category, i.e., ITM Call, ITM Put, ATM Call, ATM Put, OTM Call, and
OTM Put.16 For each stock k we compute the median of the open interest of option contracts
in a moneyness category.17,18 The daily change in open interest is calculated separately for
call and put options within a moneyness category and subsequently used to compute our
measures of options market sidedness.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the OMS+ and OMS−. The overall number of
observations is roughly 5 million for OMS+ and OMS−.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
OMS+ and OMS− are on average positively valued (0.43 and 0.46) and the 25% quantile
is also positive (0.11 and 0.16), which is to be expected since directionally informed demand
is neither permanent nor frequent; hence it would be surprising to observe a large fraction of
negative OMS values.
As control variables we construct alternative information measures the daily option volume
and option bid-ask spread. We aggregate the number of traded contracts (V OLjt,m) for each
stock as the median of the volume for call and put option (j = {C,P}) separately in each
moneyness category m. Because the distribution of V OLjt,m is right-skewed we use in our
regressions SV OLjt,m, i.e., the square root of daily volume for call or put options.
19
Similarly, we also control for bid-ask spreads. SPREADjt,m and SPREAD
j
t,m denotes the
15 To give an example: If on October 19 the December 19 contract is OTM we would not use it to compute
our measure going forward because the time to maturity is still too distant. If the contract is OTM on
November 20 and 21, we would start using it after November 21 to compute our measure going forward.
Our selection rule follows the intuition that it is rather unlikely that investors obtain signals several months
in advance. We have also considered alternative OTM day selection rules up to two weeks before maturity
and with more or less minimum OTM days; our results are qualitatively unchanged.
16 The daily preliminary open interest is reported at the end of each trading day and the final official data is
released on the following morning.
17 We use the median in order to mitigate the impact of potential outliers.
18 In what follows, we omit for reasons of simplicity the index k. Nevertheless, all measures and variables are
computed for each single underlying stock.
19 The square root of the volume is useful to normalize the variable.
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median daily relative bid-ask spread of call or put options in different moneyness categories
m.
Table 2 provides also summary statistics for option spreads and volume. The spread size
varies substantially with the moneyness ranges, the mean of the spread is roughly 1 for
the OTM options (SPREADCOTM , SPREAD
P
OTM) and roughly 0.1 for the ITM options
(SPREADCITM , SPREAD
P
ITM). This is in accordance with the well-known fact that it is
more expensive to trade in OTM options. Nevertheless, OTM options are usually the most
actively traded type of options, which is also the case in our sample. The normalized options
trading volume is relatively higher for OTM options (SV OLCOTM , SV OL
P
OTM). However, the
difference between the trading volume of OTM and ITM options is not extremely large, for
instance for call options SV OLCOTM is 4.4 and SV OL
C
ITM is 3.5. This is important since we
correlate the ITM options with the OTM options, in order to capture the information trading
related excess demand. If the level of trading activities in ITM options was extremely lower
than for OTM options, it would be difficult to identify information in OTM excess option
demand.
Other variables that we extract from CRSP are the closing price, high and low prices,
shares outstanding and the volume as the total number of traded shares of stock. We also
use a proxy for the underlying’s daily realized volatility, which we define as in Ni et al. (2008)
as 10,000 times the difference of the underlying stock’s intraday high and low prices divided
by the closing stock price (RV ). Market equity is defined as the price of a stock on day t
multiplied by the shares outstanding. The logarithm of market equity is used to measure firm
size (SIZE). We compute momentum (MOM) as the 60 days backward looking cumulative
return and long-term volatility (STD) as the square root of the averaged cumulative squared
returns. Also from CRSP we obtain a value weighted NYSE/AMEX index with dividends as
a proxy for monthly market returns. From all returns of the individual stocks and the market
index we subtract the average one month risk free rate from the Fama risk free rates file as
provided by CRSP. We obtain monthly market betas as in Easley et al. (2002) and denote the
individual stock market beta as BETA. In the daily cross-sectional regressions we include
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the stock’s previous month’s market portfolio betas to control for the single stock’s market
risk exposure. Descriptive statistics for BETA, SIZE, BM , RV , MOM and STD are in
Table 2. As a proxy for stock market illiquidity, we compute the Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure in basis points as ILLIQAmihud = 1× 1010 ∗ |RET |)/V olume, where V olume is the
daily trading volume of a stock. We extract annual fiscal year-end book equity values from
the COMPUSTAT data base.
Earnings announcement dates (EAD) are obtained from the I/B/E/S Database.
3.2 Information in Option Demand around High Information Events
In this section, we use M&A announcements to validate that our measure captures informed
demand. Prior to M&A announcements there is arguably a significant amount of asymmetric
information that is resolved at announcement.20 This implies that we expect our measure
to decrease in the pre-announcement period (as there is an increase in informed demand)
and post-announcement we expect this decrease to be reversed. To ensure that our measure
captures directional information we pair OMS+ (OMS−) with events with positive (negative)
announcement day returns.
The M&A data is from the SDC Platinum database and we follow Schwert (1996) in defining
the announcement date as the first day when an official bid becomes known. We exclude firms
that have received another bid in the same year. We calculate the cumulative change inOMS+
and OMS− from 7 days before the announcement day t = 0. Figure 1 describes the change
in the OMS measures over this period in the positive (upper subfigure) and negative (lower
subfigure) informed demand case.21 The plot of the cumulative changes for the M&A dates
is marked in green and with dots. As a benchmark we also plot (in red and with triangles)
the average OMS measure changes of firms not making announcement. The figure illustrates
20 This is different from for instance earnings announcements that are publicly known dates and that are
associated with two-sided stock markets, significant increases in option trading volumes and volatility.
21 We choose a 7-day window before the high information date as a reasonable time window before a high
information event where we would expect the major demand of investors with private information related
to the event. However, our results do not qualitatively change if we extend the time window within a
sensible range.
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that our as predicted, directly before the M&A announcement, i.e., on the evening before the
announcement day, we observe that the cumulative change in OMS+ exhibits 27 times lower
values than the benchmark case and for OMS− it is more than 30 times lower.
Moreover, there is a significant reincrease in the measures ex post the M&A announcement,
which reflects that once the news become public and options markets become more two-sided.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
To verify the robustness of the M&A announcement date results, we also consider days
with large return movements, which arguably are also events of high information. In the
positive information case we define high return events as days where the return is above the
average daily return within the subsample of days with positive returns and in the negative
information case we consider days where the return is below the average return on a negative
return day. The plot of the cumulative OMS measure changes around the extreme return
dates is marked in blue and with diamonds and confirms the patterns that we find for the
M&A announcement dates.
4 Option Market Sidedness and Future Stock Returns
In this section, we examine the relationship between options market sidedness and future stock
returns. In particular, we investigate whether an increase in options market one-sidedness,
i.e., lower OMS+ (OMS−) values, predicts higher (lower) stock returns.
4.1 Option Market Sidedness Sorted Stock Portfolio Returns
Panel A of Table 3 reports daily mean stock excess returns for equity portfolios that are
sorted into different groups according to the firm individual OMS measure value. The OMS
measure is a correlation and thus it takes values on a scale from -1 to +1. To form stock
portfolio groups, we set the portfolio break points at 0.2 interval steps of the OMS+t−1 and
14
OMS−t−1 measure, respectively, resulting in 10 portfolios.
22 We compute the mean excess
stock returns on each day t of these 10 portfolios across our sample firms.23 In Panel A of
Table 3 we observe that the OMS groups vary in their size from roughly 25,000 observations
to more than 1 million. The relatively smaller (but still quite sizeable) number of very low
OMS is intuitive since negative OMS values reflect option demand induced by extremely
strong information signals. It is also more likely that private information trading is reflected
in a gradual decrease of the measure.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Consistent with option market one-sidedness being an indicator of asymmetric information,
we find for lower values of the OMS measure (i.e., the options demand is more one-sided)
higher future equity portfolio returns if we sort according to the positive information measure
and lower future returns for the negative information case. The average daily return difference
(0.12 for OMS+ and -0.11 for OMS−) between the portfolio that is associated with the lowest
OMS values (Low) and the portfolio of stocks with the highest OMS values (High) shows
that the average daily return spread from low to high OMS values is highly significantly
different from zero and exhibits also the right sign. If we compare the lowest portfolio (1)
with portfolio (9) the economic magnitude of the return difference is even larger.
It is evident from Table 3 that the relation between the lagged OMS measures and stock
returns exhibits a nonlinear pattern. The returns decrease (increase) nonlinearly with an
increase in OMS+t−1 (OMS
−
t−1). This return pattern reflects substantial price adjustments for
extremely low OMS values and indicates that the OMS measure is able to indicate when the
information signal is strong, informed investors trade aggressively and take larger positions.
Analogously, these findings hold but with reversed signs for the equity portfolio returns of the
22 An alternative way of forming portfolios is to sort stocks into return decile portfolios and then compute
their average OMSt−1 values. However, for us it is more interesting how future stock returns line up
with the distribution of the current OMS measures, similar to the standard practice in asset pricing to
sort portfolios according to certain characteristics such as size or BM and to compare returns across those
portfolios.
23 We use stock returns that are in excess of the risk-free rate. If we risk-adjust them with respect to the
Fama-French and Carhart factors, the quality of the results remains unchanged.
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OMS−t−1 sorted portfolios. However, even with this reincrease in returns, the return spreads
between the lowest and highest portfolios are still highly significantly different from zero.
In Panel B of Table 3, we compute anOMS measure using option trading volume (V olOMS+
and V olOMS−) instead of changes in open interest. The results show that a volume based
OMS measure is not successful in identifying when markets are driven by asymmetric in-
formation and when by heterogenous beliefs. Sorting according to V olOMS+ results in
an insignificant return spread between the Low and the High V olOMS group and and for
V olOMS− the spread is significant but with the wrong sign (the returns in the Low portfolio
have to be lower than the returns in the High portfolio). Moreover, we observe that almost
all V olOMS value observations are ≥ 0, which further supports the notion that for trad-
ing volume it is rather difficult to differentiate between informed demand and other trading
motives.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Stock Return Predictions
We use Fama and MacBeth (1973) (FMB) regressions to test the relation of future individual
stock returns and the directional OMS measure.24 The empirical specification reads as,
RETt = β0 + β1OMS
+
t−1 + β2OMS
−
t−1 + bCt + t, (2)
where RETt is the daily stock return in excess of the risk free rate.
25 β0, β1 and β2 denote
the coefficients of the intercept, the OMS+t−1 and the OMS
−
t−1 measure at day t− 1. Further,
we include in (2) Ct, which is a vector of control variables such as firm size, book-to-market
ratio, market returns, lagged stock returns, long-term past stock returns, long-term past stock
return volatility and option volume. The corresponding coefficient vector is b.
We conjecture a negative (positive) sign for β1 (β2), reflecting that OMS
+
t−1 (OMS
−
t−1)
24 We choose daily windows for the entire empirical part. Obviously, informative signals can persist intradaily,
for one or two days or for longer periods, depending on the nature of the signal.
25 If we risk adjust the returns with regard to the Fama-French and Carhart factors, the quality of the results
remains unchanged.
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takes lower values due to the positively (negatively) informed demand and predicts higher
(lower) returns in the future.
Table 4 reports the main FMB-regression results with stock returns as dependent variable.26
We use percentage returns in the regressions and can therefore interpret the estimated co-
efficients directly as a percentage change in returns the day after e.g. the directional OMS
measure drops from zero to minus one.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
In column (I), we validate the predictive power of the directional OMS measure, firstly
without including any of the control variables. The coefficient of the OMS+t−1 measure is
negative and statistically significant. This supports our hypothesis that OTM call option
excess demand indicates positive information trading. Our results imply that a drop of the
OMS+t−1 measure from zero to minus one is associated with an increase of the returns on the
next day by 16 basis points (or an annualized 49% increase in returns). If we compute the
standardized coefficient we obtain for a one standard deviation decrease in OMS+ a 6.4 basis
points increase in the next day’s return (or an annualized 16%).
The coefficient of the OMS−t−1 measure is as expected positive and significant. The decrease
in the return on the next day that is implied by an OMS− measure change from zero to minus
one is 15 basis points or 6.1 basis points for the standardized coefficient.
The t-statistics of our measures are smaller than in Pan and Poteshman (2006) (who use
private data) but much larger than those generally found in this literature.
In all columns we include squared terms of our OMS measures. The squared OMS measure
coefficients always exhibit the opposite sign to the respective original measure indicating that
a negative change in the directional OMS that is close to minus one, i.e., the information
is stronger and options market are more one-sidedness, is associated with a relatively larger
26 To save space we omit the results for the stock related control variables in the table. They are available
on request.
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return movement than a negative change in OMS close to zero.27
In column (II) we also add the contemporaneous OMS+ and OMS− measures in order to
validate the predictive power of the lagged OMS variables. The testable prediction for this
specification is that the contemporaneous term exhibits the opposite coefficient with respect
to the coefficients of the lagged OMS measures since at time t the information becomes public
and options markets exhibit less information asymmetry, i.e., the OMS measures take higher
values. Furthermore, the results for the lagged coefficients should qualitatively not be affected
by including the contemporaneous term. This is exactly what we find.
In column (III), we control in addition for various other variables related to market risk,
firm characteristics, liquidity and volatility. Our results are not affected by these controls.
Our OMS measure has two key components. First, the measure is based on changes in open
interest to capture demand. In Section 4.1, Table 3 we show that performs better than volume
as informed demand indicator. Second, by relating the demand for information sensitive
contracts to insensitive contracts the measure separates informed demand from other trading
motives. Therefore, we focus now on verifying that our measure of option market sidedness
is superior to other potential measures that we could compute from changes in open interest.
In column (IV) we start with running a horse-race between the call-to-put-ratio (CP −
RATIO), which we compute for each stock as the ratio of daily changes in open interest
in call and in put option contracts minus one. As expected, we find that high values of
the CP − RATIO indicate bullish sentiment and high future returns. However, including
the CP −RATIO does not change our findings concerning the OMS measures and although
statistically significant the statistical and economic significance of the CP−RATIO is lower.28
In terms of economic significance, the standardized coefficient of the CP − RATIO is only
27 Notably, excluding those stocks within the lowest 25% quantile in terms of option volume does not affect the
quality of our results. We have also tested whether our results still hold if we run the above daily regressions
for each year in our sample separately. We find that the results are in almost all years qualitatively the
same as for the whole sample.
28 The unconditional correlation between the CP −RATIO and the OMS measures is -0.02 for the OMS+
and 0.002 for the OMS− measure, respectively. If we construct the ratio using trading volume, the
unconditional correlation between the ratio and the OMS variables is virtually zero.
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one third as large as the OMS measures’ (i.e., 2 basis points vs. 6 basis points on a daily
basis).29,30
In column (V), we include two alternative open interest based variables, ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 and
∆OI
P
OTM,t−1. The variables are the means of the changes in the open interest of OTM
call and put options in a 30-day rolling window. The results show that the simple average
level effects of both excess demand variables have weak statistical and economical predictive
power (standardizing the coefficients yields a change in the next day’s returns of 1.8 (-3)
bps for a one standard deviation change in ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 (∆OI
P
OTM,t−1)). Including these
variables does also not affect the coefficients of the OMS variables.31 Thus, basic levels are
not sufficient, illustrating that relating OTM and ITM contracts is necessary to differentiate
between different trading motives that might change the open interest.
In column (VI) we add the difference between ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 and ∆OI
P
OTM,t−1, which is an-
other alternative open interest based measure. Intuitively, the difference in both means might
become larger in case of positive informed trading and should exhibit large negative values
in case of negative information trading, yielding a positive regression coefficient. However,
the coefficient is negative, which indicates that this measure fails completely to differentiate
between changes in the open interest due to uninformed or informed reasons.
A potential alternative explanation of our results could be that investors might have in-
formation about the volatility of future returns (RV ).32 We control for volatility trading
29 Using alternatively for instance the simple call open interest, divided by the simple put open interest, does
not affect our results. Using a ratio of standardized changes in open interest does also qualitatively not
affect our results. All results are available on request.
30 In unreported results, we include, as a control for market risk premia related option trading as explanation
to the patterns that we find. More specifically, we regress the individual stock returns on directional OMS
measures for positive and negative information trading at the index level (S&P500 equity index options).
Since it is very unlikely that informed traders exploit directional signals at the index level, a significant
negative (positive) coefficient for the positive (negative) information measure on the index level in the
return regressions would indicate that OMS also picks up market risk premia (e.g., Puhan 2014, Pan
and Poteshman 2006). However, we find only insignificant results for the coefficient of the index OMS
measures.
31 The unconditional correlation between the ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 and OMS
+ is -0.04 and between ∆OI
P
OTM,t−1
and OMS− the correlation is -0.06. If we construct the 30 day averages with levels or changes in trading
volume, the unconditional correlations are virtually zero.
32 Previous work of e.g. Back (1993), Ni et al. (2008) and Puhan (2014) show that the options market contains
information on the future volatility of stock or index returns.
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by including a measure of volatility informed demand that we call OMSσ. We measure
the option demand of the volatility traders by selecting all closest to maturity ATM call
and put option pairs that could be part of a straddle strategy and correlate their change in
open interest for a 30-day backward looking window. More formally the measure reads as
OMSσ = corr(∆OICATM ,∆OI
P
ATM), where ∆OI
C
ATM denote the changes in open interest of
ATM call options and ∆OIPATM the changes in open interest of ATM put options, respec-
tively.33 This measure of volatility informed option demand takes higher values whenever the
open interest of both sides of the ATM option pair exhibits a stronger comovement, indicating
volatility information related trading.
In Appendix 2 we verify that OMSσ is indeed informative about future stock price volatility
following Ni et al. (2008); we also show that before earnings announcement dates, which are
known to be preceded by two-sided stock markets (Sarkar and Schwartz 2009) and followed by
an increase in volatility (e.g., Ni et al. 2008, Beaver 1968), the predictive power of OMSσ for
future RV increases. In Appendix 2 we also show that OMS+ and OMS− have no predictive
power for future RV neither in normal times nor before earnings announcement dates.
We start by adding in column (VII) of Table 4 the OMSσ measure. OMSσ does not
significantly predict stock returns. Furthermore, the results for the directional OMS measures
are unaffected by including OMSσ, showing that the predictive power of OMS+ and OMS−
is not associated with volatility informed trading.
Finally in column (VIII), we control for earnings announcement dates, as times of het-
erogenous beliefs and an increased future volatility, by interacting the OMS measure with
a dummy (EAD) that is equal to 1 if the date is an announcement date. If the predictive
power of the measure for stock returns is indeed due to directional information trading, the
predictive power should not increase before an earnings announcement day. Consistent with
this, we find that OMS+ · EAD and OMS− · EAD exhibit insignificant coefficients and the
33 Since the option Vega is greatest for at-the-money (ATM) options and volatility traders do not know the
direction of the future stock return movement, we make the common assumption that volatility informed
traders take straddle positions in ATM options in order to exploit their information (cf., Ni et al. 2008).
20
results for the non-interacted OMS terms remain unaffected. This supports that OMS+ and
OMS− indeed capture directional information.
In order to examine more closely the information content of option demand for future stock
returns, we investigate next, similar to Pan and Poteshman (2006), the predictability horizon
of the OMS measure. If our measures indeed pick up persistent patterns of directional
information in option demand, we would expect the predictability to persist for several days
and not to revert too quickly. So we extend the predictability horizon of OMS+ and OMS−
respectively up to 20 trading days. Figure 2 plots the slope coefficients of OMS+ on the
left-hand side and the slope coefficients of OMS− on the right-hand side. The dashed lines
are the 95% confidence-intervals.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The plots show that the predictability is robust and relatively strong during the first three
weeks in the positive information case and during the first two weeks in the negative in-
formation case. Subsequently, the predictability of OMS+ and OMS− decays further and
looses its economical and statistical significance. These results provide strong support for our
hypothesis that option market one-sidedness indicates directional informed trading.
In Appendix 3 we investigate the information flows between the options market sidedness
measures and stock returns. We test in a trivariate VAR system whether stock price changes
Granger cause options market one- or two-sidedness and vice versa. We find that the informa-
tion in the OMS measures is first reflected in the options market and moves only slowly into
the stock market, which is consistent with the persistent predictive power of the OMS mea-
sures. Our analysis also reveals that stock market news trigger options market two-sidedness,
i.e., heterogeneous beliefs.
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4.3 Sorts on Firm Characteristics
In the literature on stock and options market informed trading, several firm characteristics
such as size are associated with an increased probability of informed trading in the options
market. For instance, Easley et al. (1998) show that informed traders more likely trade in
the options market if the underlying is smaller and less liquid and Ni et al. (2008) show that
this is the case for higher volatility stocks.
In order to study the cross-sectional implications of excess option demand, we build quartile
portfolios of stocks that are sorted according to the size or volatility of a firm at the end of the
previous year. Then, we run the regression in (2) for each quartile portfolio.34 The expected
signs of the coefficients for the OMS measures are as in the above for regression model (2),
however, we expect the absolute size of the coefficient to be larger for smaller and for higher
volatility firms.
The regression results for portfolios sorted according to a firm’s size or volatility are reported
in Table 5. As in the previous regressions we control for several other factors such as past
cumulated returns, lagged return, past standard deviation of the stock returns, option volume
or market risk sensitivity.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
In the left part of Table 5, the coefficients of the call and put options market sidedness
measure (OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1) are as expected significantly negative and positive, respec-
tively. In line with the predictions from Easley et al. (1998) there is a stronger relationship
of private information trading and stock returns for smaller firms.
In the right part of Table 5, we consider cross-sectional regressions of the excess returns
of quartile portfolios that are sorted according to the yearly return standard deviation. The
coefficients of the OMS measure clearly increase in absolute terms with an increasing stock
34 We also ran regressions for stock trading volume sorted quartile portfolio excess returns. However, the
intuition for this sorting variable and the regression results are very similar to the size sorted portfolios.
Therefore, we do not report them for reasons of brevity. They are available on request.
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return volatility. These results confirm that informed traders are more likely to trade in higher
volatility stocks.
Furthermore, we observe that in both sorting exercises, the results for the other portfolios,
i.e., larger and less volatile firms, still remain significant, indicating that the predictive power
of the OMS measures not restricted to small or highly volatile firms.35
5 Trading Strategies
In this section, we assess the profitability of trading strategies based on our OMS measures.
We consider strategies based on options and the underlying. We use simple trading rules
since our primary aim is not to find a return maximizing investment strategy but to assess
the economic significance of the predictive relation between options market sidedness and
stock returns.
Lower values of the OMS measures indicate an increase in option market one-sidedness.
More specifically, lower values of OMS+ indicate higher future returns and lower values of
OMS− signal lower future returns. Hence, we choose low levels of the OMS measure as
positive or negative information trading signals. The trading signals are values of the OMS
measures that are at or below 0.36
The general trading procedure (no matter whether it is an option or an equity based strat-
egy) is as follows; whenever the trader obtains for the first time a trading signal in a time
window that starts three weeks before maturity and ends fours days before the maturity date,
the investor trades on the subsequent day. Since the open interest is reported in the evening,
the trader can obtain the signal only after the exchange closes. The last trade is possible
on three days before maturity. In order to limit the portfolio turnover, we allow for trading
35 Another indication for the broad scope of the OMS measures is that excluding the observations in the
lowest option volume quantile also does not change our results.
36 We have tested all strategies using different trading signal thresholds partly reported in Appendix 4.
The trading returns increase, the lower we require OMS to be, however, this comes at the cost of fewer
observations and a higher standard deviation in the returns to the trading strategies. Therefore, we choose
in what follows a relatively conservative threshold value.
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only at the first time a signal arrives. All positions are sold simultaneously two days before
maturity.37
In the first trading strategy we buy OTM call options in case of positive and OTM put
options in case of negative information as indicated by the OMS based trading signal. This
strategy implements the opening of new long positions that previous studies as well as our
paper associate most importantly with informed trading.38
For the second strategy, we buy those stocks, for which we obtain positive information
signals from OMS+ and sell those stocks, for which we obtain a negative information trading
signal. Even though we are interested in informed trading in options markets, we add this
equity based strategy to alleviate concerns about option bid-ask spreads.39, 40
In the third strategy, we form delta-hedged portfolios in order to verify that our trading
strategy results are not heavily biased by a higher moment risk compensation. Delta-hedging
shuts off the directional exposure of the underlying by short-selling or buying delta shares of
the underlying contract in the long call or long put strategy, respectively. Therefore, if the
returns from the above trading strategies are not largely driven by higher moment risk we
would expect very low returns or returns that are insignificantly different from zero.
To compute the strategy returns, we form portfolio groups with respect to an option’s
moneyness and time to maturity at the investment date. The moneyness groups are sorted
similar as in e.g. Chakravarty et al. (2004), Lakonishok et al. (2007) or Xing et al. (2010), that
is according to the ratio of the strike price K and the stock price S. For call options we use
K
S
and for put options we use S
K
. Clearly, a higher leverage makes an option investment more
attractive for an informed investor. However, the increasing transaction costs with higher
37 Note that for different ranges of trading windows we obtain qualitatively similar or even stronger results.
38 For example, in the evening of 01/02/2006 a trader, who follows the first trading strategy, receives a
positive signal, e.g., the OMS+ takes values that are ≤ 0, for Apple Inc.. The next day he buys an OTM
call option with expiration date 01/21/2006. He sells the option on the Thursday (i.e., 01/19/2006) before
the option expires.
39 We use the stock closing price as reported in CRSP for the day after the trading signal.
40 In Appendix 4 we provide results for trading strategies that account for different levels of transaction costs
at different trading thresholds. The results show that our results are fairly robust to including transaction
costs.
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leverage (i.e. moneyness) create a trade-off between potentially higher gains and potentially
higher costs. Therefore, we limit our trading strategy to option contracts with a moneyness of
up to and including 1.3. The time to maturity groups are formed according to the temporal
distance between the point in time when the investor receives the trading signal and the
maturity date.41
Table 6 reports the trading strategy results.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
On average in each trading round we are invested in option contracts for 430 different stocks
due to positive OMS based trading signals and in option contracts for 415 different stocks
due to negative signals depending on the strategy type. The size of the investment universe
is not only interesting from a risk perspective but also from the point of view of an investor
who would like to dedicate a notable amount of money into a strategy that follows option
market one-sidedness.
The returns in Panel A increase with moneyness and time to maturity. The average portfolio
returns for the different maturity and moneyness groups for the call option portfolio range
between roughly 9% and 27% per trading round. The returns for the long put strategy are
between roughly 14% and 32%. All returns are significant at a 1% level.
The results for the long-short strategy in Panel B are for all Fama-French and Carhart
factor adjusted returns across maturities and moneyness groups significantly larger than zero,
increase with moneyness, with the time to maturity and with the range between 0.14% and
2.22% per trading round.
Also for the delta-hedged strategy in Panel C we obtain results that are in line with our
hypotheses. Once we control for ∆-risk, the significance of the returns for the call option port-
folio evaporates completely and in many cases for the put portfolio. The negative correlation
41 We obtain the returns by first computing the average return for each trading round (i.e., maximum one
month of holding period) and then averaging over all month.
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between volatility and returns might be an explanation for why some of the put portfolio
returns remain significant.
In Appendix 4 we also report results of a second set of trading strategies, where we choose
as trading signals decreases in the OMS+ and OMS− measures. The results are qualitatively
the same as for the trading strategy that trades on the levels of the OMS measures.
One possible interpretation of the predictability and the significant trading profits for the
long options and long-short stock strategy could be that options market sidedness picks-
up mostly momentum signals. Therefore, in Appendix 4 we also test whether the OMS
measure reflects more information than pure momentum.42 We find that option market
sidedness captures directional information in option trading that is clearly different from pure
momentum signals and that also helps to identify (private) directional signals for securities
that a simple momentum strategy would neglect.
6 Option Demand and Future Stock Market Trading
A possible alternative explanation of our results is that options market sidedness is related to
illiquidity of the stock. Informed option market trading could have an impact on stock market
trading or reflect that traders expect the stock to be relatively illiquid and hence they prefer
to use options to exploit their information. The predictive power of OMS would in such
cases result from illiquidity premia. Hence, if more options market one-sidedness (i.e., lower
OMS values) indicates higher asymmetric information in the options market rather than
illiquidity premia, we would expect that option demand imbalances are not able to explain
the future and contemporaneous variation in stock market illiquidity. To test this, we regress
the stock illiquidity measure as suggested by Amihud (2002) (ILLQAmihud) on our options
market sidedness measures.
Second, we show in this section that two-sided (as measured by OMS) markets are associ-
ated with higher stock market trading volume. This is important since it supports that the
42 See Appendix 4 for details.
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strong return predictive power of OMS is not due to an increase in hedging demand. To this
end, we regress stock market trading volume on our OMS measures.
In Table 7, we report the results from FMB-regressions that explore the relationship of
stock market trading and options market sidedness.43
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
In columns (I) and (II), ILLQAmihud is the dependent variable. In column (I) we use the
lagged OMS measure as independent variable and in column (II) we use OMS contempo-
raneously. Neither the lagged nor the contemporaneous OMS measure yield a significant
coefficient. This provides support for our hypothesis that the return predictability, which we
find in the above, is not related to stock market liquidity premia.
In columns (III) and (IV), V OLStock is the dependent variable. In column (III) we use the
lagged OMS measure as independent variable and in column (IV) we use OMS contempo-
raneously. The coefficients for all OMS measures are positive and significant, reflecting a
positive relation between upward level shifts in trading activities in the stock market and a
jointly increasing excess demand across all option contract types (i.e., two-sided markets).
Conversely, a more one-sided options market is correlated with lower trading activities in
the stock market. These findings supports the insight in Easley et al. (1998) that informed
trading in the options market is more likely for firms with lower trading volumes. Moreover,
it also emphasizes our hypothesis that trading in the stock market (and hence options market
trading that is potentially related to hedging demand) is related to level shifts in the demand
across all option types and moneyness categories and not to options market one-sidedness.
Overall, the results support our hypothesis that the predictive ability of OMS for stock
returns is associated with asymmetric information rather than with stock market trading
related risk premia, spillover effects or hedging demand.
43 We have also estimated panel OLS regressions with and without firm level fixed effects as well as with
standard errors clustered by firm level or by firm level and month. The quality of our results remains
unchanged.
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7 Option Price Pressure and Informed Option Demand
A very natural extension of our study is to explore the response of options market makers to
options market sidedness, or, put differently, the relation between informed option demand
and price pressure in the options market.
Easley et al. (1998) find that the price pressure on call or put options increases with the
relative amount of informed traders and the probability of the arrival of a positive or negative
signal. Other studies like Back (1993), Cao and Wei (2010), Wei and Zheng (2010), Garleanu
et al. (2009), Muravyev (2013) and Ni et al. (2008) also show that asymmetric information,
and thus informed trading activities coincide with a widening of option bid-ask spreads.44
This implies that market makers, who cannot perfectly hedge their inventories, observe in the
evening, when the open interest is reported, the demand pressure in a particular option type
and increase on the next day the option bid-ask spreads for the respective contract (see e.g.,
Easley et al. 1998, Garleanu et al. 2009, Kyle 1982, Ni et al. 2008).
Therefore, we expect that a higher options market one-sidedness (i.e., lower values of OMS)
predicts wider option bid-ask spreads for the respective options that are bought by the in-
formed investors.45
Using again FMB-regressions, we regress the OTM call and put spreads on the lagged
OMS+ and OMS− measure respectively and we also add stock specific control variables
e.g., size, past long-term stock returns and stock return volatility and options market specific
controls such as option volume.
In Table 8 we report the option spread FMB-regression results.46
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
44 See e.g. Madhavan (2000) for a comprehensive review of theoretical models that establish asymmetric
information and inventory risk costs of market making.
45 Since market makers do not observe the open interest intra-daily, they can only react on the next day to
the information contained in open interest changes. This implies that the profits of the informed investors
are not quickly wiped out because of liquidity effects.
46 We have also estimated panel OLS regressions with and without firm level fixed effects as well as with firm
level or firm level and month clustered standard errors. Our results do not qualitatively change and we
find no evidence for a substantial firm effect.
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The spread regressions in columns (I) and (III) confirm the expected negative relation
between the lagged OMS measures and the stock individual bid-ask spread. In addition,
the results are almost identical for both call and put option spreads, which corroborates that
the impact of the demand pressure is similar for the positive and negative information case.
All results are robust to the controls that we include in columns (II) and (IV). Overall, the
findings show that the OMS measure can be useful as a new liquidity measure in the options
market.47
Intuitively, the reaction of the market makers to the informed demand contributes to a
relative increase in future pricing inefficiencies between both market sides, for instance to
violations of the put-call parity (PCP).48 Therefore, we also test in this section whether more
one-sided options markets, i.e., lower OMS measure values, predict larger violations of the
PCP.
Apart from arguably the demand pressure of informed traders, there are many other rea-
sons in the real market that determine the empirically observed violations of the PCP. For
American options, the early exercise premium, and for all option types general frictions such
as short-sale constraints or taxes, can lead to violations of the PCP. However, for our purposes
the general fact that the PCP might be violated is irrelevant since we are interested whether
higher values of the PCP violations are associated with more one-sided options markets.
Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) point out that deviations from the PCP are not only related
to inefficient pricing that could be easily arbitraged away and show that informed trading may
increase deviations from the PCP. In addition, in the sequential trading model of Easley et
al. (1998) informed trading can result in violations of the put-call parity. Thus, we expect
that options market one-sidedness also predicts absolute PCP deviations with a positive sign.
Kamara and Miller (1995) and Ackert and Tian (2001) show that PCP deviations reflect
47 In unreported results we find that options market sidedness does not affect option liquidity risk premia.
This is in line with the notion of informed option trading as exploitation of private directional information,
which by itself, however, remains unobserved by the uninformed investors.
48 Previous studies such as Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) or Easley et al. (1998) provide evidence in support
of this hypotheses.
29
option liquidity risk by regressing PCP deviations on option liquidity risk proxies. In or-
der to investigate the relation between our measure of option demand asymmetry and PCP
deviations, we first compute:
|PCP 1| = |aC − bP +Ke−rT − Sbid|, (3)
and
|PCP 2| = |aP − bC + Sask −Ke−rT |, (4)
where a and b denote the daily ask and bid price for the put and call options, respectively. T
is the time to maturity in days, K is the strike price and r is the risk free rate. The FMB-
regressions also control for several other stock individual and options market specific factors
such as size, book-to-market, past returns, historical volatility or trading volume. Similarly
to the spread regressions, we expect a negative coefficient for the lagged OMS measures,
implying larger future absolute PCP violations when options markets are more one-sided.
The regression results in Table 9 yield as expected a negative predictive relation between the
OMS measures and the PCP deviations. Whenever the option demand indicates asymmetric
information, the future PCP deviations increase.
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
This supports our hypothesis that informed trading in options markets creates a one-sided
demand pressure, which impacts the deviations of the pricing relations in the options market.
The findings imply that informed options market demand contributes to deviations from
no-arbitrage pricing relations, which puts a fundamental principle of most option pricing
approaches further into question.49
49 Also all of our results in this section qualitatively hold if we use only the 75% largest firms in our sample
in terms of trading volume. Hence, it is unlikely that our results are mainly driven by the fact that illiquid
options, that is those options that are most likely to exhibit PCP deviations, drive the results.
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8 Conclusion
This paper combines the concept of market sidedness with excess option demand (changes
in open interest) to solve the empirical challenge of separating directional from uninformed
trading motives and from other sources of return predictability than directionally informed
demand in widely available, unsigned options data.
The guiding idea of our “options market sidedness” (OMS) measure is that if traders
obtain informative signals on the future direction of stock returns, and decide to exploit their
information in the options market, they create an imbalance in the excess option demand
between those contract types that they are likely to buy and other contract types whose
demand is predominantly driven by hedging demand, liquidity or noise trading. The larger
the informed demand, the more one-sided is the options market. Informed investors tend to
buy those contract types that allow them to take a leveraged position on the direction of their
information (i.e., OTM options).
Hence, the measure of OMS relates the changes in open interest of OTM option contracts,
that are likely to be used by directionally informed traders, with the changes in open interest
for low leverage (ITM) option contracts, that are unlikely to be used by directionally informed
traders and indicates trading on positive and negative signals as well as the strength of the
information at an individual security level.
Using daily data of all securities at the intersection of the OptionMetrics Ivy DB, CRSP
daily return files and Compustat from January 1996 until December 2009 we find: First,
the OMS measure for the call (put) market predicts increasing (decreasing) stock excess
returns, beyond past returns and several other controls. Second, returns for option and stock
investment strategies that trade on the informed demand in options are high. Third, prior
to high information events such as M&A announcements, the one-sidedness of the markets
increases, consistent with the increased asymmetric information. After the announcement
the option demand is again more two-sided, reflecting the decrease in information asymmetry.
Fourth, other trading motives such as volatility informed trading, liquidity or hedging demand
31
do not drive our results.
Our study also contributes empirical evidence to the potential sources of a demand related
option price pressure as modeled by Garleanu et al. (2009). We show that at higher levels of
informed option demand future options market liquidity is lower and pricing inefficiencies are
larger.
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Tables & Figures
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Variables. The table provides summary descriptive
statistics for sample variables across the full sample period from January 1996 until December 2009.
The table reports the mean, the standard deviation (Std), the median, the 25 percent (Q25) and the 75
percent quantile (Q75) across all sample firms. OMS+ and OMS− are the options market sidedness
measures for the positive and negative information case, respectively (for details see Section 2). BETA
is the individual stock market beta, SIZE is the logarithm of market equity. BM is the logarithm
of the book-to-market ratio measured by book equity divided by, market equity using the fiscal year-
end value preceding year. The realized volatility (RV ) is in basis points and is defined as in Ni et
al. (2008) as 10,000 times the difference of an underlying stock’s intraday high and low prices divided
by the closing stock price. MOM is the cumulative return over a 60 days backward looking window.
STD is the average realized standard deviation obtained from the daily returns over a 60 days backward
looking window. SPREADCOTM and SPREAD
C
ITM are the median daily relative bid-ask spreads of call
options that are OTM or ITM. SPREADPOTM and SPREAD
P
ITM are the median daily relative bid-ask
spreads of put options that are OTM or ITM. SV OLCOTM and SV OL
C
ITM denote the square root of
the daily median call option trading volume that are OTM or ITM. SV OLPOTM and SV OL
P
ITM denote
the square root of the daily median put option trading volume that are OTM or ITM. The descriptives
for the OMS measure, the daily option spreads and option volume are formed using all days where the
respective variable was nonzero.
Mean Std Q25 Median Q75 No. Obs.
OMS+t 0.423 0.398 0.114 0.473 0.751 5,015,363
OMS−t 0.461 0.397 0.158 0.526 0.795 5,396,556
BETA 1.206 0.418 0.842 1.095 1.442 7,011,930
SIZE 7.208 1.629 6.089 7.115 8.221 7,011,930
BM 0.784 5.784 0.256 0.446 0.745 7,011,930
RV 415.06 359.582 198.413 315.217 510.386 7,011,930
MOM 0.032 0.267 -0.091 0.0378 0.160 7,011,930
STD 0.0312 0.019 0.018 0.026 0.039 7,011,930
SPREADCOTM 1.108 0.780 0.303 1.028 2.000 6,918,180
SPREADCITM 0.100 0.145 0.047 0.075 0.111 6,920,299
SPREADPITM 0.115 0.180 0.049 0.078 0.121 6,799,572
SPREADPOTM 1.074 0.739 0.353 1.000 2.000 6,797,715
SV OLCOTM 4.423 4.558 1.871 3.162 5.292 6,918,180
SV OLCITM 3.507 3.399 1.581 2.739 4.123 6,920,299
SV OLPITM 3.741 4.429 1.581 2.739 4.472 6,799,572
SV OLPOTM 4.559 5.021 2.000 3.162 5.292 6,797,715
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Table 4: FMB-Regression Results for Daily Individual Stock Excess Returns on the Directional
OMS Measures and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results of individual stock’s
excess returns (RET ) on the directional OMS measures as well as on control variables. Returns are in
percentages. OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1 are the lagged options market sidedness measures for the positive and
negative information case, respectively (for details see Section 2). OMS2,+t−1 and OMS
2,−
t−1 are the corresponding
quadratic terms. SV OLCOTM and SV OL
C
ITM is the square root of the daily median call option trading volume
that are OTM or ITM. SV OLPOTM and SV OL
P
ITM is the square root of the daily median put option trading
volume that are OTM or ITM. CP − RATIO is a daily ratio of the aggregated changes in open interest for
call options divided by the aggregated changes in the open interest for put options minus one. ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1
is a 30-day rolling window mean of the change in open interest in OTM call options. ∆OI
P
OTM,t−1 is a 30-day
rolling window mean of the change in open interest in OTM put options. EAD is a dummy that is one if the
day is an earnings announcement day and zero otherwise. The results for the stock related control variables
(Stock Controls) are omitted. Stock Controls includes: EAD, market beta (BETA), size (SIZE), book-to-
market (BM), momentum (MOM), volatility (STD). The definitions of the control variables are summarized
in Appendix 1. Newey-West robust t-statistics are in parentheses (20 lags). *** indicate a significance at a
1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. The R2 is the average cross-sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms
is the overall number of stocks in the regression. The sample period is January 1996 to December 2009.
RETt (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Constant 0.045 0.048* -0.087 -0.122** -0.095* -0.086 -0.051 -0.05
(1.59) (1.67) (-1.47) (-1.97) (-1.66) (-1.46) (-0.85) (-0.84)
OMS+t−1 -0.166*** -0.502*** -0.169*** -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.158*** -0.169***
(-11.55) (-8.08) (-11.57) (-10.13) (-11.68) (-11.66) (-12.11) (-11.49)
OMS−t−1 0.167*** 0.593*** 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(10.72) (9.62) (7.18) (7.46) (7.1) (7.15) (9.09) (7.45)
OMS2,+t−1 0.215*** 0.21*** 0.195*** 0.184*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.174*** 0.195***
(13.34) (13.12) (13.54) (11.93) (13.58) (13.5) (12.55) (13.43)
OMS2,−t−1 -0.255*** -0.254*** -0.227*** -0.239*** -0.224*** -0.226*** -0.223*** -0.225***
(-16.22) (-16.16) (-14.12) (-14.45) (-13.92) (-14.02) (-14.42) (-14.15)
OMS+t 0.344***
(6.06)
OMS−t -0.435***
(-7.6)
SV OLCOTM 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.077***
(21.39) (21.11) (21.51) (21.7) (19.62) (21.3)
SV OLCITM -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.077***
(-4.99) (-4.97) (-5.03) (-4.91) (-3.29) (-4.84)
SV OLPITM 0.082*** 0.08*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.081***
(13.60) (13.29) (13.45) (13.51) (9.82) (13.80)
SV OLPOTM -0.15*** -0.147*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.138*** -0.135***
(-28.00) (-27.21) (-28.56) (-28.45) (-26.20) (-28.09)
CP −RATIO 0.001***
(3.94)
∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 0.000*
(1.68)
∆OI
P
OTM,t−1 -0.001***
(-6.70)(
∆OI
C
OTM,t−1
−∆OIPOTM,t−1
)
-0.001***
(-5.61)
OMSσt−1 0.007
(1.47)
OMSCt−1 · EADt 3.56
(1.00)
OMSPt−1 · EADt -1.496
(-1.07)
Stock Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.003 0.006 0.112 0.119 0.113 0.113 0.128 0.132
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
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Table 7: FMB-Regression Results for Stock Liquidity Related Measures on the OMS measure
and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results. In columns (I) and (II) the dependent
variable is the stock individual Amihud (2002) liquidity measure (ILLIQAmihud), in columns (III) and (IV)
we use the stock trading volume (V OLStock) as the regressand. ILLIQAmihud is computed as (1 × 1010 ∗
|RET |)/V olume, where V olume is the daily trading volume of a stock. V OLStock is the logarithm of the
daily trading volume of a stock. OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1 are the lagged options market sidedness measures
for the positive and negative information case, respectively (for details see Section 2). OMS2,+t−1 and OMS
2,−
t−1
are the corresponding quadratic terms. The other regressors are market beta (BETA), size (SIZE), book-
to-market (BM), lagged returns (RETt−1), momentum (MOM), volatility (STD). The definitions of the
control variables are summarized in Appendix 1. Newey-West robust t-statistics are in parentheses (20 lags).
*** indicate a significance at a 1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. The R2 is the average
cross-sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms is the overall number of stocks in the regression. The sample period
is January 1996 to December 2009.
Dependent Variable ILLIQAmihud,t V OLStock,t
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Constant 0.259*** 0.259*** 1.320*** 1.328***
(19.32) (19.48) (46.32) (46.49)
OMSCt−1 0.001 0.034***
(0.58) (15.52)
OMSPt−1 0.000 0.039***
(-0.36) (23.38)
OMSCt 0.001 0.031***
(0.69) (15.69)
OMSPt -0.001 0.035***
(-0.81) (22.86)
ILLIQAmihud,t−1 0.483*** 0.482***
(66.57) (66.50)
V OLStock,t−1 0.781*** 0.781***
(157.8) (158.19)
BETA -0.048*** -0.048*** 0.393*** 0.392***
(-8.16) (-8.11) (19.69) (19.61)
SIZE -0.026*** -0.026*** 0.162*** 0.162***
(-20.20) (-20.32) (49.18) (49.19)
RET -0.078 -0.078 0.931*** 0.93***
(-0.91) (-0.92) (7.97) (7.85)
RETt−1 -0.032** -0.034** -0.599*** -0.6***
(-2.07) (-2.07) (-21.84) (-21.82)
MOM 0.009*** 0.01*** -0.124*** -0.124***
(2.73) (2.94) (-28.03) (-27.97)
STD -0.616*** -0.621*** 7.903*** 7.93***
(-14.09) (-14.09) (30.86) (30.90)
Adj. R2 0.345 0.345 0.848 0.847
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
41
Table 8: FMB-Regression Results for Individual Firm Option Bid-Ask Spreads on
the OMS Measure and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results using as
dependent variables daily median individual firm bid-ask spreads for OTM call (model (I) and
(II)) and put (model (III) and (IV)) options, respectively. OMS+ and OMS− are the options
market sidedness measures for the positive and negative information case, respectively (for details
see Section 2). For the ITM and OTM option classification see Section 3. The other regressors are
size (SIZE), book-to-market (BM), returns (RET ), momentum (MOM), volatility (STD). The
definitions of the control variables are summarized in Appendix 1. SV OLCOTM and SV OL
C
ITM
denote the square root of the daily median call option trading volume that are OTM or ITM.
SV OLPOTM and SV OL
P
ITM denote the square root of the daily median put option trading volume
that are OTM or ITM. Newey-West robust t-statistics are in parentheses (20 lags). *** indicate
a significance at a 1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. The R2 is the average cross-
sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms is the overall number of stocks in the regression. The sample
period is January 1996 to December 2009.
OTM Call Spread OTM Put Spread
Option Spreads (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Constant 0.002 -0.045** 0.016 -0.09***
(0.12) (-2.08) (0.81) (-4.46)
OMS+t−1 -0.018*** -0.011***
(-4.38) (-2.91)
OMS−t−1 -0.045*** -0.039***
(-9.24) (-8.91)
SIZE 0.009*** 0.009***
(4.75) (4.05)
RETt−1 -2.261*** 2.466***
(-35.45) (38.64)
MOM -0.562*** 0.533***
(-27.50) (26.63)
STD 0.896*** 0.795***
(3.12) (2.82)
SV OLCOTM -0.042***
(-28.31)
SV OLCITM 0.009***
(7.13)
SV OLPITM -0.002***
(-2.83)
SV OLPOTM -0.038***
(-28.55)
Adj. R2 0.001 0.08 0.002 0.068
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
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Table 9: FMB-Regression Results for Individual Firm Put-Call Parity Violations on the OMS
Measure and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results for daily median individual firm
Put-Call Parity violations. Put-Call Parity violations are defined as described in Section 7. OMS+t−1 and
OMS−t−1 are the options market sidedness measures for the positive and negative information case, respectively
(for details see Section 2). OMS2,+t−1 and OMS
2,−
t−1 are the corresponding quadratic terms. Ct is the vector
of control variables that are specified below. The other regressors are market beta (BETA), size (SIZE),
book-to-market (BM), lagged returns (RETt−1), momentum (MOM), volatility (STD). The definitions of
the control variables are summarized in Appendix 1. SV OLCOTM denotes the square root of the daily median
OTM call option trading volume. SV OLPOTM denotes the square root of the daily median OTM put option
trading volume. Newey-West robust t-statistics are in parentheses (20 lags). *** indicate a significance at a
1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. The R2 is the average cross-sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms
is the overall number of stocks in the regression. The sample period is January 1996 to December 2009.
Put-Call Parity PCP 1 PCP 2 PCP 1 PCP 2 PCP 1 PCP 2
Constant 0.393*** 0.391*** -0.076 0.343*** -0.077 0.342***
(40.87) (53.00) (-1.32) (13.61) (-1.35) (13.72)
OMS+t−1 0.008 -0.021*** 0.002 -0.023*** -0.117*** -0.014*
(0.73) (-6.54) (0.15) (-7.62) (-3.64) (-1.94)
OMS−t−1 0.012 -0.017*** -0.014* -0.024*** -0.03** -0.03***
(1.14) (-3.48) (-1.69) (-6.00) (-2.17) (-3.29)
OMS2,+t−1 0.154*** -0.013
(4.29) (-1.52)
OMS2,−t−1 0.02 0.009
(1.01) (0.94)
BETA 0.04*** -0.009** 0.041*** -0.009**
(4.31) (-2.40) (4.32) (-2.44)
SIZE 0.054*** 0.012*** 0.055*** 0.012***
(8.43) (3.55) (8.53) (3.60)
BM 0.048*** 0.006** 0.048*** 0.006**
(6.43) (2.2) (6.44) (2.25)
RETt−1 -0.005 0.046*** -0.011 0.047***
(-0.22) (4.20) (-0.52) (4.31)
MOM 0.062*** 0.112*** 0.063*** 0.111***
(4.97) (18.46) (4.97) (18.33)
STD -0.325 -1.4*** -0.293 -1.394***
(-1.29) (-7.96) (-1.17) (-7.92)
SV OLCOTM -0.02*** -0.005*** -0.02*** -0.005***
(-9.17) (-6.20) (-9.13) (-6.18)
SV OLPOTM 0.01** -0.006*** 0.009* -0.006***
(1.96) (-9.71) (1.92) (-9.68)
Adj. R2 0.002 0.003 0.042 0.031 0.042 0.032
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
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Figure 1: Informed Option Demand and High Information Events. In this figure, we compare the
mean values of the cumulative change in the OMS measures before M&A announcements and days with large
return movements as events of high information revelation. We define positive (negative) information large
return days as days when the return is above (below) the mean return of all days with positive (negative)
returns. As a control group we use the full sample average. The high information date is defined as t = 0.
We plot the cumulative changes of the OMS+ and OMS− measure for the 7 days before high information
events. The plot of the cumulative changes for the full sample is marked in red and with triangles. The plot
of the cumulative changes for the M&A dates is marked in green and with dots. The plot of the cumulative
changes for the extreme return dates is marked in blue and with diamonds. The upper subfigure plots the
different variables for the positive information case. The lower subfigure plots the different variables for the
negative information case. The full sample period is January 1996 to December 2009.
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Figure 2: Predictability Horizon of the OMS Measure for Future Stock Returns. In order
to obtain the plotted time series, we run daily FMB-regressions of the following form
RETt = β0 + β1OMS
+
t−i + β2OMS
2,+
t−i + β3OMS
−
t−i + β4OMS
2,−
t−i + bCt + t,
where i = {1, 2, . . . 20}. That is, we regress excess stock returns in percent at time t on the t− i lag of
the positive and negative information OMS measure (OMSjt−i with j = {+,−}) and the t− i lag of the
respective quadratic term (OMS2,jt−i). The vector of control variables (Ct) is as in the main regression
in (2). The left figure plots the slope coefficient of OMS+ measure. The right figure plots the slope
coefficient of OMS− measure. The dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The sample period is
January 1996 to December 2009.
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Appendix 1 Stock Market Control Variables Definitions
Table A1: Stock Market Control Variables Definitions.
Variable Definition
BM The previous year’s end-of-year book equity divided by market equity (cf., Daniel and Titman 2006).
BETA Monthly market betas estimated as in Easley et al. (2002).
HI The underlying stock’s intraday high price.
LO The underlying stock’s intraday low price.
MOM 60 days backward looking cumulative return.
PRC The underlying stock’s closing price.
RV The underlying’s daily realized volatility, HI−LOPRC ∗ 10, 000 (cf., Ni et al. 2008).
SHROUT Number of shares outstanding.
SIZE log(PRC ∗ SHROUT )
STD Square root of the 60 days backward looking average cumulative squared returns.
Appendix 2 Controlling for Volatility Informed Trading
To validate our measure of volatility informed option demand we test, similar to Ni et al.
(2008), whether the OMSσ measure predicts the stock individual realized volatility RVt by
estimating the following FMB-regression:
RVt = β0 + β1OMS
σ
t−1 + β2OMS
σ
t−1 · EADt + b1Dt + b2Ct + t, (5)
with
Dt =
[
OMS+t−1 OMS
+
t−1 · EADt OMS−t−1 OMS−t−1 · EADt
]
(6)
as the vector of variables that control for directional informed trading. Ct is again a set of
control variables, which additionally includes current and lagged RV to control for information
in current and lagged RV . The corresponding coefficient vectors are b1 for Dt and b2 for
Ct. EADt is one if t is an earnings announcement date (EAD) for the respective stock and
is zero otherwise.
Previous literature shows stock return volatility is likely to increase after earnings announce-
ments (e.g., Ni et al. 2008, Beaver 1968) and the insight that volatility informed investors
are more likely to trade prior to earnings announcement dates (see Ni et al. 2008, Sarkar and
Schwartz 2009), we expect a positive slope coefficient for OMSσ · EADt, i.e., β2 > 0 and
(β2 + β1) > 0. For the OMS
σ measure it is ambiguous, which coefficient to expect because
high and low volatility bets could result in an increase in open interest of both contract types.
However, we include the variable into the regression in order to control for non-EAD times.
A significant positive coefficient for the OMSσ measure indicates that on average a large
increase in ATM straddle trading is associated with an increasing future volatility.
Since EADs are public knowledge and markets tend to be largely driven by diverse beliefs
prior to EADs (cf., Sarkar and Schwartz 2009, Choy and Wei 2012), we expect the impact
of directional informed trading before announcement dates to be negligible. Thus, for the
directional OMS measure we conjecture an insignificant coefficient for the EAD interacted
OMS measure. For the non-EAD interacted OMS measures, we expect, if at all, negative
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signs for the coefficients, implying that decreasingOMS+ andOMS− indicate for both market
sides an increase in the future realized stock return volatility. This is intuitive since the future
price discovery in the stock market is most likely associated with an increase in the return
volatility, no matter whether the stock returns increase or decrease.
Table A2 reports the results for the volatility predictive regressions.
We express the realized volatility in basis points, therefore the coefficients indicate daily
basis point changes after e.g. the OMS measure drops from zero to minus one. To save space
we omit the regression results of the controls. In row (I) the coefficients are significant at the
1% level. The coefficient for the OMSσ is not straight forward interpretable due to the fact
that ATM straddle bets on increasing as well as decreasing volatility would both increase the
open interest in the respective call and put option pairs. However, the EAD interacted OMSσ
coefficient is directly interpretable since earnings announcements are usually associated with
an increase in return volatility. The coefficient of the EAD interacted OMSσ measure is as
expected positive and β2 + β1 > 0, implying that an excess demand in call and put option
ATM straddle pairs conditional on an EAD strongly indicates trading on increasing future
volatilities. This corroborates our expectations and validates OMSσ as indicator of volatility
trading.
In row (II) we add OMS+ and OMS− in order to verify the robustness of the results for the
OMSσ measure. Furthermore, this specification helps to provide support to the hypothesis
that the OMS+ and OMS− measures are associated with directional information trading.
In particular, we are interested in the coefficient of the OMS measures around EADs. The
results show that indeed the EAD interacted directional OMS measures exhibit neither for
the positive nor for the negative information case a significant coefficient. For the entire time
series of the realized volatility, a lower directional OMS measure implies for both market sides
increases in the future realized stock return volatility, which is in line with our expectations.
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Appendix 3 Information Flows between OMS and Stock Returns
To investigate the information flows between the options market sidedness measures and stock
returns we test in a trivariate VAR system whether stock price changes Granger cause options
market one- or two-sidedness and vice versa.
For this purpose, we model the following VAR(5) system50: RETtOMS+t
OMS−t
 = c + 5∑
p=1
Bp
RETt−pOMS+t−p
OMS−t−p
+ εt
with Bp as a (3× 3) the coefficient matrix.
The VAR can be reformulated as an infinite vector moving average model, that is VMA(∞):
Yt = µ+ εt + Ψ1εt−1 + Ψ2εt−2 + . . . , (7)
where Ψ1, Ψ2,. . . denote the MA coefficients. From (7) we compute impulse response functions
that give the response of the system variables to a one unit shock in one variable of the VAR.
We use the cumulative values of the impulse response function to measure the total impact
of a shock for up to 25 days. The resulting cumulative impulse response functions for the
relations of interest are displayed in Figure 3.
A one unit negative change in the innovation of the OMS+, i.e., an increase in options
market one-sidedness due to positive information, results in an increase of returns (left upper
panel in Figure 3). Analogously, the right upper panel in Figure 3 illustrates that a negative
shock from the OMS− measure on stock returns results in a decrease of stock returns. The
figures indicate that it takes several days until the impact of the shock in the OMS measure
on returns is fully incorporated. Hence, private information in options markets at time t
is only gradually incorporated into prices in t + 1 and throughout the following days. The
results further corroborate our hypothesis that more one-sided markets indicate asymmetric
information in the options markets and that indeed markets are not efficient and directional
information moves with a considerable lag from options to stock markets.
Furthermore, the effects of return related shocks to the options market sidedness measures
provide support to the notion that stock return news trigger joint demand shifts in the options
market and make it more two-sided. Positive return innovations in the stock market result
in an increase in OMS+, reflecting an increase in options market symmetry simultaneously
to the public news arrival and price readjustment in stock markets (left lower panel in Figure
3). Similarly, negative return shocks have a positive impact on OMS−, which analogously
to the positive information case reflects an increase in options market symmetry (right lower
panel in Figure 3).
50 We tested a large range of different lag sizes and do not find substantial qualitative differences between
the specifications. Thus, we choose one trading week as a time window.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Impulse Response Function. The figure shows cumulative impulse response
functions using a horizon of 25 days and the VAR(5) specification: RETtOMS+t
OMS−t
 = c + 5∑
p=1
Bp
RETt−pOMS+t−p
OMS−t−p
+ εt,
with Bp as a (3×3) coefficient matrix. The upper left panel depicts the cumulative impulse response function
(CIR) for a negative one unit change in the innovation of OMS+ on stock returns. The upper right panel
depicts the CIR function for a negative one unit change in the innovation of OMS− on stock returns. The
lower left panel depicts the CIR function for a positive one unit change in the innovation of the stock returns
on OMS+. The lower right panel depicts the CIR function for a negative one unit change in the innovation of
the stock returns on OMS−. The sample period for the VAR estimation is January 1996 to December 2009.
The dashed lines represent 95% confidence bounds.
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Appendix 4 Additional Trading Strategy Results
As a first robustness check, we increase the trading threshold to study how sensitive our
strategy returns are to increasing the threshold. More specifically, we choose the 25% quantile
of OMS+ (0.11) and OMS− (0.16). In each trading round we are on average invested in option
contracts of 1462 different stocks associated with positive OMS trading signals and in option
contracts for 1553 different stocks associated with negative signals depending on the strategy
type. In Table A3 we report the trading strategy results.
In summary, the returns are lower than those for the OMS = 0 threshold but in general
the results are robust to increasing the trading threshold to the 25% quantile. The decrease
in returns is to be expected since we trade on a relatively larger fraction of weaker informative
or relatively uninformative signals. On the other hand, it also shows that the results in the
main text for the OMS = 0 threshold are not just driven by some outliers that are averaged
out once we increase the window of possible trading thresholds.
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Next, we introduce transaction costs to our benchmark case, i.e., the trading threshold of
OMS+ or OMS− being 0. Transaction costs for trading options are known to be particularly
large for OTM options and are significantly larger than those for stocks. For instance, Ni
(2010) and McKeon (2013) show that option trading returns for call options are likely to be
negative for the average investor. However, for a more sophisticated investor with directional
information and in particular also on the put market side, this might be different. Hence,
it is interesting to test whether the substantial returns to the OMS based option trading
strategies are relatively robust to accounting for transaction costs.
However, there are some caveats to keep in mind when interpreting these results. First,
similar to Ni (2010) and McKeon (2013) we have no data on the actual trading accounts and
hence on the actual trading costs; we can only generally account for transaction costs based
on the option spread. Hence, these results are to be treated with caution since for instance for
institutional investors (which are also most likely to be the informed traders) the transaction
costs are much lower than what we assume here while for a retail investor they could also
be larger. Second, our trading strategy takes the perspective of an investor, who tries to
follow options market one-sidedness and is can only trade at least one day (or potentially
also several days) after the informed traders exert a one-sided demand pressure on market
makers. As we have seen in Section 7 informed trading increases future spreads. Hence, in
some situations the spreads might be significantly smaller for the informed investor who as a
consequence will be much less affected by transaction costs than an uninformed trader who
tries to follow the information that market one-sidedness reveals. Third, one more caveat for
interpreting these results is that our trading strategy does not incorporate the spread size as
a side condition, which is likely to be the case at least for more sophisticated traders that
often use trade algorithms that optimize transaction costs.
Table A4 reports the results for rerunning the option trading strategies for the OMS = 0
threshold accounting for transaction costs that amount to 25% (Panel A) and 50% (Panel B).
The results show that even after accounting for substantial transaction costs, trading on
OMS still yields substantial returns. However, there is obviously a trade-off between taking on
leverage and the larger spreads that are implied by OTM options. Despite the fact that OTM
options are the most frequently traded option type, spreads increase substantially the further
the option is OTM. Therefore for some of the trading strategy results, the profits become
negative. However, for relatively longer investment periods and also for closer to the money
options, the returns are relatively robust to incorporating these hypothetical transaction costs.
Put options returns are also more robust to transaction costs.
We would expect that choosing a more extreme (in terms of market one-sidedness) trading
threshold for OMS is also likely to improve the spread adjusted trading strategy returns. To
demonstrate the effect of lowering the trading threshold value of OMS we report below trading
strategy results using a threshold ofOMS+ orOMS− being -0.2. Using this trading threshold,
we invest still into a fairly large amount of option contracts for different underlyings, that is
option contracts for 147 different company stocks on average per trading round for positive
information trading and option contracts on 139 different stocks on average per trading round
for negative information trading.
Table A5 summarizes the results for rerunning the option trading strategies applying a
trading threshold of OMS = −0.2 and accounting for transaction costs that amount to 25%
53
(Panel A) and 50% (Panel B).
The results highlight that the more informative the trading signal that we use, the more
robust is the trading strategy to transaction costs. The put option results remain all qualita-
tively unchanged even when accounting for transaction costs amounting to 50%. The results
for the call options are also for almost all option types and investment durations positive and
significant, only for relatively far out of the money options with very short times to maturity,
the profits become insignificantly different from zero on average or are negative.
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In a second set of trading strategies, we choose as trading signals decreases in the OMS+
and OMS− measures that are larger than the respective average decrease in OMS between
date t− 2 and t− 1 before a high information event (see Section 3.2), i.e., -0.055 for OMS+
and -0.07 for OMS−.
In Table A6 we report mean returns of the portfolios that are formed in each trading
round (roughly one month) for each trading strategy, i.e., long call, long put, long-short stock
or delta-hedged, respectively. On average in each trading round we are invested in option
contracts of 941 different stocks due to positive OMS based trading signals and in option
contracts for 992 different stocks due to negative signals depending on the strategy type.51
The results for the simple long put option strategy in the right part of Panel A show that
farther OTM options provide on average for each trading round higher portfolio returns. The
average portfolio returns for the different maturity and moneyness groups range between 9.5%
and 36% per trading round. The left part of Panel A shows the profitability of OMS based
OTM long call option strategies. The profits across all maturity and moneyness groups range
between 6% and 22% per trading round. The t-statistics in parentheses are significant at a
1% level in almost all cases.
Panel B reports the results for the investment strategy that goes long in those stocks, for
which we obtain a positive OMS based trading signal, and that sells those stocks, for which we
obtain a negative information signal from OMS−. As in the above, we use stock returns that
are orthogonalized with respect to the Fama-French and Carhart factors. All returns across
maturities and moneyness groups are significantly larger than zero, increase with moneyness
and with the time to maturity and range between 0.47% and 2.24% per trading round.
The economic significance of the options market sidedness hypothesis is further corroborated
by the results for the delta-hedged strategy in Panel C. Most of the delta-hedged returns are
statistically not different from zero and only some are slightly and significantly larger than
zero. This supports the view that it is directional information rather than a higher moment
risk compensation that shows up in the returns of the above strategies.
51 For very extreme values of ∆OMS (e.g., -0.2) these numbers go down below 50 and the trading strategies
yield very high positive returns but are also more volatile.
57
T
a
b
le
A
6
:
M
e
a
n
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
R
e
tu
rn
s
fo
r
∆
O
M
S
B
a
se
d
O
p
ti
o
n
T
ra
d
in
g
S
tr
a
te
g
ie
s
A
c
ro
ss
M
a
tu
ri
ti
e
s
a
n
d
M
o
n
e
y
n
e
ss
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
ro
v
id
es
m
ea
n
p
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
op
ti
on
p
or
tf
ol
io
tr
ad
in
g
st
ra
te
g
ie
s
u
si
n
g
va
lu
es
o
f
∆
O
M
S
a
s
tr
a
d
in
g
si
g
n
a
l
th
a
t
a
re
la
rg
er
th
a
n
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
av
er
a
g
e
d
ec
re
a
se
in
O
M
S
b
et
w
ee
n
d
at
e
t
−
2
an
d
t
−
1
b
ef
or
e
a
h
ig
h
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
ev
en
t,
i.
e.
,
-0
.0
5
5
fo
r
O
M
S
+
a
n
d
-0
.0
7
fo
r
O
M
S
−
.
O
M
S
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
s
d
et
a
il
ed
in
S
ec
ti
on
2.
W
e
fo
rm
p
or
tf
ol
io
gr
ou
p
s
w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
th
e
o
p
ti
o
n
s’
m
o
n
ey
n
es
s
a
t
th
e
in
ve
st
m
en
t
d
a
te
a
n
d
th
e
b
eg
in
n
in
g
ti
m
e
o
f
th
e
in
v
es
tm
en
t
in
re
la
ti
o
n
to
th
e
m
at
u
ri
ty
d
at
e.
T
h
e
m
on
ey
n
es
s
gr
ou
p
s
ar
e
so
rt
ed
a
cc
o
rd
in
g
to
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
th
e
st
ri
ke
p
ri
ce
K
a
n
d
th
e
st
o
ck
p
ri
ce
S
.
T
h
e
d
ay
s
to
m
a
tu
ri
ty
g
ro
u
p
s
a
re
fo
rm
ed
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
th
e
te
m
p
or
al
d
is
ta
n
ce
in
tr
ad
in
g
d
ay
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
p
o
in
t
in
ti
m
e
w
h
en
th
e
in
ve
st
o
r
re
ce
iv
es
th
e
tr
a
d
in
g
si
g
n
a
l
a
n
d
th
e
m
a
tu
ri
ty
d
a
te
.
W
e
re
p
or
t
se
p
ar
at
el
y
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
ca
ll
(l
ef
t
p
ar
t)
a
n
d
p
u
t
(r
ig
h
t
p
a
rt
)
o
p
ti
o
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s.
R
et
u
rn
s
a
re
in
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
es
a
n
d
co
m
p
u
te
d
fo
r
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
h
ol
d
in
g
p
er
io
d
of
th
e
in
ve
st
m
en
t,
w
h
er
e
tw
o
d
ay
s
b
ef
o
re
m
a
tu
ri
ty
a
ll
p
o
si
ti
o
n
s
a
re
so
ld
.
T
h
e
fi
rs
t
st
ra
te
g
y
(P
a
n
el
A
)
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s
ei
th
er
to
lo
n
g
O
T
M
ca
ll
fo
r
p
os
it
iv
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
O
M
S
b
as
ed
tr
ad
in
g
si
g
n
a
ls
o
r
to
lo
n
g
O
T
M
p
u
t
in
ca
se
o
f
n
eg
a
ti
ve
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
O
M
S
b
a
se
d
tr
a
d
in
g
si
g
n
a
ls
.
In
th
e
se
co
n
d
st
ra
te
gy
(P
an
el
B
)
w
e
b
u
y
th
os
e
st
o
ck
s,
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
w
e
o
b
ta
in
p
o
si
ti
ve
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
O
M
S
b
a
se
d
tr
a
d
in
g
si
g
n
a
ls
a
n
d
si
m
u
lt
a
n
eo
u
sl
y
sh
o
rt
th
o
se
st
o
ck
s,
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
w
e
ob
ta
in
n
eg
at
iv
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
O
M
S
tr
ad
in
g
si
g
n
a
ls
.
T
h
e
th
ir
d
st
ra
te
g
y
(P
a
n
el
C
)
y
ie
ld
s
re
tu
rn
s
b
y
fo
rm
in
g
d
el
ta
-h
ed
g
ed
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s.
F
o
r
d
et
a
il
s
on
th
e
tr
ad
in
g
st
ra
te
gi
es
se
e
S
ec
ti
on
5.
T
-v
al
u
es
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
is
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
9
6
to
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
9
.
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
L
o
n
g
O
p
ti
o
n
O
n
ly
S
tr
a
te
g
y
C
a
ll
O
p
ti
o
n
P
o
r
tf
o
li
o
R
e
tu
r
n
s
P
u
t
O
p
ti
o
n
P
o
r
tf
o
li
o
R
e
tu
r
n
s
T
im
e
to
M
a
tu
r
it
y
(i
n
tr
a
d
in
g
d
a
y
s)
3
-7
d
a
y
s
8
-1
4
d
a
y
s
1
5
-2
1
d
a
y
s
3
-7
d
a
y
s
8
-1
4
d
a
y
s
1
5
-2
1
d
a
y
s
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
2
1
.8
2
1
5
.6
6
6
.2
0
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
1
9
.4
0
9
.5
6
9
.5
2
(5
.0
5
)
(2
.9
3
)
(1
.3
3
)
(4
.1
6
)
(2
.4
3
)
(2
.4
1
)
K S
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
1
3
.7
3
1
7
.0
0
1
1
.3
1
S K
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
2
3
.1
2
2
8
.4
9
2
4
.8
(3
.9
7
)
(3
.2
4
)
(2
.4
1
)
(4
.4
3
)
(2
.7
1
)
(3
.0
4
)
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
1
5
.9
6
9
.1
0
6
.6
2
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
2
0
.1
2
3
6
.0
4
3
2
.5
9
(2
.5
4
)
(2
.4
3
)
(1
.7
3
)
(4
.2
)
(3
.4
3
)
(4
.2
6
)
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
L
o
n
g
-S
h
o
rt
S
to
ck
S
tr
a
te
g
y
T
im
e
to
M
a
tu
r
it
y
(i
n
tr
a
d
in
g
d
a
y
s)
3
-7
d
a
y
s
8
-1
4
d
a
y
s
1
5
-2
1
d
a
y
s
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
0
.4
7
0
.8
9
1
.6
0
(4
.3
9
)
(6
.8
6
)
(6
.6
8
)
K S
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
0
.5
5
1
.2
0
1
.8
7
(5
.0
7
)
(8
.2
4
)
(5
.6
2
)
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
0
.7
1
1
.4
0
2
.2
4
(4
.9
6
)
(7
.5
9
)
(5
.4
)
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
D
el
ta
-H
ed
g
ed
O
p
ti
o
n
S
tr
a
te
g
y
C
a
ll
O
p
ti
o
n
P
o
r
tf
o
li
o
R
e
tu
r
n
s
P
u
t
O
p
ti
o
n
P
o
r
tf
o
li
o
R
e
tu
r
n
s
T
im
e
to
M
a
tu
r
it
y
(i
n
tr
a
d
in
g
d
a
y
s)
3
-7
d
a
y
s
8
-1
4
d
a
y
s
1
5
-2
1
d
a
y
s
3
-7
d
a
y
s
8
-1
4
d
a
y
s
1
5
-2
1
d
a
y
s
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
0
.3
0
0
.7
0
1
.6
0
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
0
.1
4
0
.5
4
2
.2
8
(1
.5
5
)
(1
.4
4
)
(1
.6
4
)
(0
.7
7
)
(0
.5
7
)
(4
.4
4
)
K S
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
0
.1
0
0
.9
0
1
.0
4
S K
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
0
.2
8
0
.7
1
2
.3
7
(0
.8
5
)
(1
.5
9
)
(2
.2
8
)
(1
.0
3
)
(0
.3
6
)
(3
.9
7
)
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
0
.1
9
0
.1
2
1
.7
0
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
0
.3
9
1
.0
3
2
.7
4
(0
.4
8
)
(1
.9
7
)
(2
.7
5
)
(1
.1
4
)
(2
.1
8
)
(4
.9
1
)
58
To test whether options market sidedness captures more that just momentum, we rerun
the trading strategies using three different approaches. We first sort the stocks in each month
m according to their average (m-2:m-12)-month stock return and then use the top quintile as
the winner portfolio and the bottom quintile as the loser portfolio.52 In our first testing ap-
proach, we aim at shutting off momentum signals as major explanation of the trading strategy
returns. Therefore, we trade on positive signals only within the subsample of stocks in the
loser portfolio, i.e., those stocks that we would sell in a momentum strategy. Additionally,
we generate OMS based negative information signals and trade on them by buying puts or
shorting stocks only within the winner portfolio, i.e., the portfolio of stock that we would buy
in a momentum strategy. Intuitively, we restrict our positive signal trading to the sample,
where we would expect the least positive momentum and the negative signal trading to the
sample, where we would expect the least negative momentum. In these “reversed-momentum”
subsamples we would expect substantially worse or even economically insignificant results for
our trading strategies if the options market sidedness measure mainly picks-up momentum
signals. The results are reported in A7. In summary, the analysis shows that the returns that
we generate by selecting investments for “momentum” or “reversed-momentum” portfolios,
conditioning on the OMS measures, are on average higher for those portfolios that a tradi-
tional momentum trader would not expect to perform well. This corroborates that options
market sidedness captures information in option trading that is clearly different from pure
momentum signals and that also helps to identify (private) directional signals for securities
that a simple momentum strategy would neglect.
52 In unreported tests we also exclude the month of January or December or both months in order to
control for possible effects from window dressing and the January effect. Our results remain qualitatively
unchanged, however for some moneyness-maturity groups the profits are lower.
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